Defense Reorganization by Mansfield, Mike, 1903-2001
University of Montana
ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches Mike Mansfield Papers
6-11-1958
Defense Reorganization
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches
This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "Defense Reorganization" (1958). Mike Mansfield Speeches. 304.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/304
s c fl, e "- ' ·, -.: ~£ 1 ·~ c, f... r' Ol"-.( 
- Speech of Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Mbntana) 
FOR RELEASE 
DEFENSE REORGANIZATION 
In a message to Congress on April 3, 1958, 
forth his recommendations 
On April 16, 1958, a bill, E.R. 11958, was introduced which was announced as 
the Administration's proposals to enact the President's proposals into law. 
The Administration's bill was referred to the House Committee on Armed Services. 
Hearings were promptly held by that Committee at which major officials for the 
Administration testified at length. 
At the conclusion of these hearings the House Committee on Armed 
Services introduced a new bill, H.R. 12541. The Committee bill was developed 
in consultation with Administration representatives and with representatives 
of the White House. Before the bill was introduced, the President announced 
his congratulations to the committee and stated that "by and large the bill 
seems to deal positively '"i th every major problem I presented to the Congress." 
He expressed reservations on t'vo points. 
I' 
In later strongly worded public statements, the President expressed 
his displeasure with three points in the Committee's bill. Those three points 
are as follows: 
I. Direction, Authority, and Control Exercised Through the 
Respective Secretaries of the Military Departments 
II. Roles and Missions 
III. Legalized Insubordination 
I. Direction, Authority, and Control Exercised Through the Respective 
Secretaries of the Military Departments 
Under present law, the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 
places the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, within the 
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Department of Defense and makes them military departments in lieu of their 
prior status as Executive Departments. The Secretary of Defense is the head 
of the Department of Defense and is designated as the principal assistant to 
the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. The Sec-
retary of Defense has, under the National Security Act, direction, authoYity, 
and control over the Department of Defense. Present law also prescribes 
(Sec. 202(c)(4)) that the Departmenta of the Army, Navy, and Air Force shall 
be separately administered by their respective Secretar~es under the direction, 
authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. 
The President has contended vigorously that the provision that the 
military departments be "separately ad-:1inistered" is a "hindrance to efficient 
administration" ancl. that it is "inconsistent and confusing." During ~he hear-
ing on the Actn.ir~istration' s bill, witnesses "1-rere asked to cite instar.ces where 
the authori-ty of the Secretary of Defense was challenged or hampered in any 
way by these "~>Tords. No convin~iag evidence could be produced. No single in-
stance was cited wherein the authority of the Secretary of Defense was effec-
tively challenged. 
Nevertheless, the issue has been raised and the Committee on Armed 
Services examined in detail the question of how the Secretary of Defense was 
to exercise his authority and what position the military departments were to 
have if they were not to be separately administered by ~heir respective sec-
retaries. 
As a result of this study, the Committee bill provides that ''each 
military department shall be separately organized under its own Secretary 
and shall function under the direction, authority, and control of the Secre-
tayy of Defense exercised through the respective Secretaries of such depart-
ments." 
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'I'he Cornmi ttee bad the firm assurance of the President and all of the 
Administration witnesses that merger of the military departments was not con-
templated. It was, in fact, unthinkable from an administrative point of view. 
If the military depa~tments are not to be merged, it follows they must be 
separately organized. 
The President stated in hio message of April 3, that he did not 
question the necessity for continuing the military departments, and that 
there is a clear necessity for tlle Secretary of Defense to decentralize the 
administration of the huge defense organization. 
In keeping with these f8elings, which the Armed Services Committee 
apparently shared, the Committee's bill removes the language found offensive 
by the President and substituted language y,•hicb provides for precisely t~e 
type of organization the Administration contf')nded ~ms necessary. 
Howe.-e:r, the Administration objected to the words "exercised torough 
the respective Secretaries of such de:;;>artments." Tr.ey contend J.:.hat such lan-
guage is ambigt:.ous and can be interpreted in such a way as to 21ake the secre-
taries of the military departments administrative bottle-necks to effective, 
direct control by the Secretary of Defense. 
If the military departments are to be separately organized, not 
merged into one conglomerate ~anageable ma~s, each department must have a 
head and that person must be responsible for the affairs of his department. 
Witho'.lt. such a responsible head who bas clearly established boundaries of 
responsibility, the integrity of each department is gone and with it goes 
the decentralization wcicl::. the President says is necessary. 
Without the language requiring the Secretary of Defense to exercise 
his authority, direction, and contrcl through the Secretaries of the military 
departments, the Secretaries of the military departments lose their power and 
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authority to administer their departments. The military departments become 
one great amOrphous mass with every official in t~e Departme~t of Defense 
possessing a license to bypass the service secretaries. Under these condi-
tions, there is no need for service secretaries. They could not be held 
responsible for their respective departments. Either there will be three 
military Secretaries operating under the direction, authority, and control 
of the Secretary of Defense and responsible for their military departments, 
or there should no longer be three military Secretaries responsible for these 
military departments. 
To provide that authority shall be exercised throug_~ the Secretaries 
of the military departments does nothing more than establish a chain of com-
mand w~ich is clearly understood by every military man and by every person 
familj_e,r. w:~_:t;h the principles of leadership and sound business organization. 
The c=.ain o-:: ····.:-:..7:u:.·i ;;rescribed "!'lere i::; t~e s~•:~a as that prescribed i:-~ :riJ.5.-
tary or- sa.v.ize ~;~(~n rr..J. n.t~als as a basic principal of sound organiz.ation. 'l'he 
commander exercises his co~~and through his s~bordinate u~it commanders. 
The validity o~ this doctrine has been established through centuries of mili-
tary experience. When the doctrine is not followed, there is chaos, confusion 
and a disintegraticn of the organizational structure. 
As the House Armed Services Com:nittee observed in their Report No. 
1765 of 111ay 22, 1958, "Elimination of this line of command and responsibility 
from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the military departments 
would mean, for all practical p~rposes, the commingling of the operations of 
all departments and services within the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
which would become a huge over-centralized, and unmanageable administrative 
conglomeration." 
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The chain 6f command prescribed in the Committee bill pinpoints 
responsibility and clarifies beyond ar~m~ent the civilian line of command 
within the Department of Defense. It in no way impinges upon the authority 
of the Secretary of Defense over his department, nor does it hamper in any 
way his and the President's direct control over unified and specified com-
mands. 
The Admintstration would delete the prescription that the Secretary 
of Defense exercise his direction, authority, and control over the military 
departments through the respective Secretaries of those departments. Yet, 
spokesmen for the Administration have affirmed and reaffirmed their inten-
tions to preserve the integrity of the departments and their military services. 
They ha.-re said merger is not planned nor would it be desirable. They have de-
c] 3.re;'l tha t G.Pcer..trftlization is essential and tl::.at the Secretaries of the rnili-
ta:Ly depart .. l'.· , ·~ ::D··· • :; be ~·es:pon::: i':>le fc ·~ thl" :;.-:- de:)ar-:ntents. It is ~\':·-· '"'- ~ t:Jl-= 
to recc.r. ::·~.J.e '. :·.~:ir ::.•:: jections ·co this p.covision with their repC'a tedl~r expressed 
statements of their intentions. 
II. Roles and Missions 
The proposal of the President, with regard to certain aspects of the 
authority sought for the Secretary of Defense, would take a Constitutional 
power ~xclusively leg~slative in nat~r8 and transfer it to an appointed officer 
in the execut~ve branch of the gover~ent. Th~ Administration bill would per-
mit the Secretary of Defense to transfer, reassign, abolish, or consolidate 
any function, including combatant functions, by simply notifying the Armed 
Services Committees 30 days before the change was to take effect. 
If Congress were to thwart such a move, it would be necessary to 
pass a law prohibiting such action by the Secretary of Defense. Since the 
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Secretary's proposal would undoubtedly have Presidential approval prior to its 
submission, then it could be expected that the President would veto this legisla-
tive action. Consequently it would be necessary for Congress to muster the nec-
essary votes to override a veto in order to protect a statute on this subject. 
H. R. 12541, the product of the House Armed Services Committee hear-
ings ar.d deliberations, would make some changes in this procedure. Under this 
bill, if a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to object to the transfer 
of a function from one service to another, the matter would be brought to the 
attention of the Congress. If, within 60 session days, Congress were to pass 
a concurrent resolution in opposition to such a proposed plan, the action 
could not be taken. Thus, the difference between the two bil+s is that under 
the House version a majority of the Congress could thwart the nullification of 
a law by the Secretary of Defense, while under the President's proposal it 
would take two-thirds of each body of the Congress to prevent such action. 
The President has ta.lten violent exception to the provisions of H.R. 
12541 on the basis that this would vest "astonishing authority in one military 
man," would be an impediment to progress, subordinate civilian judgm.:nt, and 
repudi~te flexibility of combat functions. 
These objections of the President are indeed surprising when ex-
amined in contex~ with the subject. For example, his first objection is 
that the House bill would vest too much authority in one military man. It 
ie erparent that he refers to the ability of one member of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff to bring the issue of the transfer of a combatant function from one 
service to another before the Congress. The fact that this is merely a statu-
tory vehicle for presenting to Congress basic issues of military policy, which 
are properly the concern of Congress, escapes the President as does the more 
important fact that his bill would in truth vest even more astonishing authority 
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in one man, the Secretary of Defense. This authority in the Secretary of 
Defense is indeed extraordinary because it is contrary to the explicit pro-
visions of the Constitution and violates the fundamental philosophy upon which 
our government is formed. The Constitution gives certain responsibilities with 
regard to our military forces to the Congress. They include the responsibility 
of providing for the common defense, of providing and maintaining a Navy and 
raising and supporting Armies. In addition Congress has the exclusive legisla-
tive power. To deliver to the Secretary of Defense the responsibility for 
prescribing the broad and general roles and missions of our armed services 
would be in violation of each of these Constitutional provisions. 
The President's contention that it subordinates civilian judgment, 
authority and responsibility and is an endorsement of the concept of military 
superiority over civilian authority is equally difficult to understand. To 
say that the fact that Congress would have a reasonable opportunity to act in 
prevention of the repudiation of a law by the Secretary of Defense constitutes 
in any way a derogation of civilian judgment or authority is almost beyond be-
lief. The fact that the House bill will in some measure prevent the repeal 
of a law by unilateral executive fiat should leave no doubt that civilian 
authority is strengthened. It is not certain how much military thought would 
be behind such a Pentagon plan but it is reasonably certain that very little 
military thought would be involved in the legislative action required to re-
view such a proposal under the House bill. 
The National Security Act sets forth in broad terms the general 
functions of each of the services. The President and the Secretary of Defense 
have the authority, and have frequently exercised it, to assign the details of 
these combatant functions. There is no evidence that this system has failed 
to meet the requirements of flexibility. Congress has indicated its willingness 
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by repeated action to change or add to the National Security Act. If develop-
ments indicate that changes are required then the executive, acting under the 
Constitution, should present such recommendations to the Congress. Now it 
might be said that this would not provide a system with sufficient speed. 
There is no reason to draw this conclusion because certainly if the matter 
were presented in its proper picture the Congress could and would act at least 
within the 30-day period which the President's bill sets forth. The important 
difference is that this would be compliance with our Constitutional legislative 
process while the plan of the President would be in direct violation of this 
procedure. 
It has been said that so long as Congress has the "purse-strings" 
then it need not worry about its ability to discharge its constitutional 
responsibilities with regard to the armed services. An examination of recent 
history discloses immediately the fallacy of this proposition. There are many 
instances whereby the will and intent of Congress, expressed by way of appro-
priations for particular purposes has been denied by executive action. Congress 
may appropriate whatever it desires but unless the executive will expend that 
money for those purposes the legislative action has little effect. 
"Examples: Truman and Air Force; Eisenhower and Marines and 
National Guard; McElroy and 900, 000-man army. " 
If Congress is to perform its duties and live up to its Constitutional 
responsibilities, control of the general missions and functions of the several 
services must be retained. 
III. Legalized Insubordination 
The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, ~ow provides in 
Sec. 202(c)(6) as follows: 
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"No prov1s1on of this Act shall be so construed as to prevent a 
Secretary of a military department or a member of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff from presenting to the Congress, on his own initiative, after 
first so informing the Secretary of Defense, any recommendation relat-
ing to the Department of Defense that he may deem proper. " 
The bill which received the unanimous approval of the House Armed 
Services Committee (H.R. 12541), retains this provision. 
President Eisenhower has declared that this section encourages and 
sanctions insubordination. He has labelled it "legalized insubordination." 
The President's objection to this provision apparently rests upon 
the feeling that it legalizes an implied threat from any Secretary or service 
chief who dislikes a decision made by the Secretary of Defense; and that it 
is in derogation of the President's position as Commander in Chief. 
There was no evidence presented to the Committee to indicate that 
this provision of law had caused any difficulty in the past. In fact, there 
is no evidence that it bas ever been used. 
The Administration's strong opposition to this feature of the Com-
mittee's bill is very strange in light of the fact that since 1948 a Federal 
statute bas prohibited the restriction of any member of an armed force in com-
municating with a member of Congress, unless the communication is unlawful or 
violates a regulation necessary to the Security of the United States. 10 USC 
1034. 
This provision has been the law of the land through the administrations 
of two Presidents. President Truman did not deem it necessary to recommend the 
repeal of either this provision or the one in the National Security Act. Ap-
parently they did not constitute an onerous burden to his administration. Sec-
tion 202(c)(6) was in the National Security Act in 1953 when President Eisenhower 
adopted Reorganization Plan 6 and reorganized the Defense Department. No mention 
of it was made at that time. Apparently it did not constitute "sand in the gear 
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box" during his first term, for it has never been mentioned until now. No 
complaints have been lodged against this feature of the National Security Act 
until this time. One would think that by now both the restriction in the 
National Security Act and the broader protection for all members of the Armed 
Forces in Title 10 would have become festering sores to the orderly administra-
tion of the Defense Department. If the National Security Act provision is to 
be repealed why should not 10 USC 1034 also be repealed? 
Repeal of the provision guaranteeing the right of Secretaries of the 
military departments and the chiefs of services to come to Congress with their 
recommendations would present an anamolous situation indeed. The service 
chiefs, as members of the armed forces, would still enjoy the protection af-
forded by section 1034, title 10, U.S. Code, while the Secretaries of the mili-
tary departments would be unprotected, for they are civilians. 
It is passing strange that the Administration should develop strong 
feelings about this provision at the same time that the public information and 
congressional liaison activities of the military departments are being consoli-
dated and centralized in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. While it may 
be pure coincidence, it encourages doubt and suspicion as to the aimes of the 
Administration. 
It is likewise worthy of note that the Administration's desire for 
repeal of this provision in the National Security Act reflects a lack of under-
standing of the Constitutional powers and responsibilities of Congress in the 
field of military affairs and the armed forces. The President is Commander in 
Chief and has all of the awesome power of command that such a title implies; 
but the Constitution also places what appear to be larger and more varied 
responsibilities for military affairs upon the Congress. The officers of the 
armed forces and the secretaries of the military departments take an oath to 
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support and defend the Constitution. Thus, they are placed in an extremely 
difficult moral position if they do not hsve the right to go to Congress after 
first so informing the Secretary of Defense. 
Mr. President, this concludes my statement on the three points in 
the House Committee's bill with which the President expressed strong dis-
pleasure. I would also like to call to the attention of the Senate some rec-
ommendations which I made earlier this year in a series of speeches on the 
Defense Department. At that time I summarized the highlights of my remarks 
on the Defense Department establishment as follows: 
(1) The power of Congress to prescribe roles and missions for the 
armed forces must rema:l.n with the Congress and not be transferred to the 
Executive. 
(2) The collective judgment of the Joint Cciefs of Staff is a 
super~or mechanism than would be the creation cf a single chief of staff or 
principal military advisory to the President. 
(3) The number of assistant secretaries, their assistants, com-
missions and committees in the Pentagon should be reduced drastically and 
the civilian bu!'eaucracy in the Department of Defense should be overhauled. 
( 4) The Cordiner Report or something approximating 1 t should be 
adopted. 
(5) The minimum IQ's of all enlistees and inductees should be 
ra:l sed to a more realistic standard. 
(6) If the Cordiner Report, or something similar to it, is adopted, 
the draft should be abolished. 
It is to be noted that of those six recommendations, recommendation 
No. 4, having to do with the Cordiner Report, has been adopted. I should like 
to urge the Senate to give serious consideration to the remaining proposals 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 39, Folder 65, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
..... -
- 12 -
for strengthening the Department of Defense and for bringing about a reorganiza-
tion within it to the end that greater efficiency, better management, and a 
more realistic recognition of what needs to be done will be the result. 
I would think, Mr. President, that it would be advisable for the 
Senate Armed Services Committee to call before it, in its consideration of 
the House measure, such recognized experts on the subject as Ferdinand 
Eberstadt, Hanson Baldwin, former Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, 
Admiral Robert Carney, General Clifton B. Cates, and others who, on the basis 
of their expert knowledge, should be of great assistance to the Committee in 
arriving at a reasonable, sound and Constitutional conclusion. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to include with my remarks 
two news analyses by Hanson \IT. Baldwin of the New York Times 1 entitled, 
"Pentagon Reorganization" and "Revised Pentagon Bill". 
Mr. President, one of the most vital speeches relative to the re-
organization of the Department of Defense was given on the Floor of the House 
of Representatives on June 5, 1958, by the Honorable Paul Kilday, one of the 
real Congressional authorities on defense matters. I ask unanimous consent 
that this speech by Mr. Kilday be inserted at this point in the record, and 
I would most strongly urge my colleagues to read it with great care. 
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